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from banking regulation. Deposit insurance can give rise 
to moral hazard, as depositors no longer have to ascertain 
whether the bank they deal with acts prudently so that it 
can repay deposits as required. Another version of moral 
hazard arises when large banks get to be classed as too big 
to fail: incentives for prudent behaviour are undermined. 
Another potential problem is looting, which we discuss 
further below: managers may seek to enrich themselves at 
the expense of small shareholders and depositors.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. We next look at 
the process of deregulation that occurred in New Zealand, 
and then at the reregulation that occurred after around 
2000. After that we come back to look at governance 
issues and their interaction with regulation. We conclude 
by asking whether New Zealand regulation has, in the end, 
been very effective.
2. The Process of Deregulation
New Zealand’s regulatory framework began to be eased 
a little in the 1970s, with changes such as banks being given 
greater freedom to set their own interest rates on lending, 
and permission to offer new products. These were often in 
response to changes in the global economic environment 
which meant, for example, that there was a demand for 
foreign-exchange hedging, not previously necessary while 
all exchange rates globally were fixed relative to each 
other. 
Also in response to this environment, new institutions and 
new classes of institutions were established to offer new 
products and services, from which existing institutions might 
have been barred. Regulatory frameworks often struggled 
to keep up with these new institutions, and when some of 
them got into difficulty, some social disruption occurred as 
these institutions were dealt with under standard insolvency 
legislation. A response to this was the Securities Act 1978 
and accompanying regulations, which set out the process 
for issuance of the prospectuses required for solicitation of 
funds by entities other than banks, savings banks, building 
societies and credit unions. This was intended to ensure that 
investors received standard format information on what 
they were investing in.
In an attempt to control inflation, the re-elected Muldoon 
government in 1981 imposed wide-ranging wage and price 
controls. It moved in 1982 to extend these to the financial 
sector, on the basis that the financial sector should be seen 
as sharing the burden of restrictions in the battle against 
inflation. These were primarily effected through setting 
maximum interest rates on various classes of loans, although 
there were also restrictions on bank lending growth, with 
regulatory powers continually extended as financial 
institutions found ways to circumvent them. By the time the 
Muldoon government lost office in July 1984, the mesh of 
regulation had become extensive, and the financial sector 
was quite constrained in providing financial services. In this 
regulated environment, access to borrowing from banks 
was something of a privilege, with the less privileged having 
to utilise the services of other institutions
The election of the fourth Labour Government in 1984 
provided the opportunity for much of the previous regulatory 
structure to be dismantled. Over a short period, interest rate 
restrictions, foreign exchange controls, the fixed exchange 
rates, mandatory liquid assets holdings (through the reserve 
asset ratio system) were abolished, as were restrictions on 
private foreign borrowing.2 Later in 1985, proposals were 
advanced for allowing new banks to enter the market; 
this and a number of other changes were codified in 
a 1986 amendment to the Reserve Bank Act. Opening 
up the market to new banks necessitated developing a 
set of rules for registration of banks, replacing a previous 
system which had required individual acts of parliament. 
The only quantitative requirement for registration was a 
minimum capital level of $15 million. This was all intended 
to promote a more efficient and competitive banking 
market. Requirements were codified further in the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 (Dawe, 1990). Throughout 
the process, major changes were also made in respect 
of monetary policy and its implementation, including the 
adoption of inflation targeting.
A consequence of deregulation was that the banking 
sector was no longer as disadvantaged in offering financial 
services and competing with other financial institutions. 
Some previous classes of institutions, such as official short-
term money market dealers,3 disappeared, while other 
non-bank financial institutions converted to bank status. 
This meant that the numbers of participants within some 
classes of financial institutions, such as building societies 
and finance companies, were considerably reduced, while 
the savings banks all converted to bank status and looked 
to broaden the scope of activities they undertook.
The overarching principle to be applied to regulating the 
banking sector was set out in an article in the May 1987 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin (Staff, 1987).4  This 
proposed that the Reserve Bank should not be concerned 
about the failure of individual institutions, but only with the 
failure of multiple institutions through a systemic financial 
crisis. Moreover the object of policy should be failure 
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1. Introduction
This paper provides an overview of some recent history of 
banking and financial services regulation in New Zealand. 
This is of interest because, particularly during the latter 
part of the 1980s, the New Zealand banking and financial 
system was deregulated very swiftly, according to a 
different set of regulatory principles, to become one of the 
most lightly regulated financial systems in the world. Barth 
et al (2001) included New Zealand among a small group 
of countries that permitted the widest latitude in terms of 
the activities banks might undertake. This light-handed 
regulation persisted through the 1990s and subsequently, 
although since around 2000 steps have been taken to put 
more power into regulators’ hands. 
The regulatory structure that existed from the 1930s to 
the 1980s for the New Zealand banking and financial sector 
was particularly pervasive.1 Developed following the great 
depression of the 1930s, it generally reflected a preference 
for managing the economy to achieve broader objectives 
around economic growth and development: finance 
should be the servant of this process. Markets were not 
seen as important, with a feeling in some circles that it 
was markets that had engendered the great depression, 
and that markets should be prevented from repeating this 
process. With no particular role for markets, regulation also 
lead to a segmentation of the financial sector, with different 
classes of financial institutions specialising in different types 
of loans and other products. 
In a broader context, Spong (2000) identifies four 
main strands to justify the regulation of financial services 
firms: protection of depositors, monetary and financial 
stability, an efficient and competitive financial system 
and consumer protection. Depositor protection (often 
addressed by deposit insurance) addresses depositors’ 
inability to look after themselves. Monetary and financial 
stability is concerned with protection of the payments 
system and the avoidance of systemic banking crises, and 
costs that such disruptions or crises would impose on society 
more broadly. An efficient and competitive financial 
system will be able to support more financial intermediation 
at lower prices, and be able to respond better to changing 
economic conditions and technological advances. It also 
reduces the costs of trading goods and services. Consumer 
protection is concerned with preventing abusive practices 
and ensuring fair access to financial services for all.  Spong 
also argues that banking regulation should not be directed 
at preventing bank failures, at providing for governments 
to override bankers’ decision-making, or favouring certain 
groups over others. Prior to 1984, regulation in New Zealand 
was not generally consistent with Spong’s principles.
Prior research also identifies negative consequences 
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applied to reporting market risk exposures, as per Harrison 
(1996), although the Reserve Bank chose not to follow the 
Basel Committee’s guidelines, and did not require capital 
against market risk.9
Reliance on disclosure was most unorthodox 
internationally, with most countries preferring to apply 
specific prudential regulation on exposures, and to have 
programmes for specific examination of banks.10 Consistent 
with Spong’s principles, it is common to adopt deposit 
insurance schemes to protect unsophisticated retail 
depositors, whereas the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has 
no specific objective to protect bank depositors per se.11 
Despite the disclosure regime having been publicised 
by the Reserve Bank, research has found relatively limited 
public awareness of how it operates, with many people 
believing that the government or the Reserve Bank would 
ultimately protect their deposits.12 At least for retail deposits, 
there is no obvious indication that interest rates are sensitive 
to (agency) credit ratings. The Reserve Bank continues to 
identify the disclosure regime as the basis for prudential 
supervision (Fiennes & O’Connor-Close, 2012), although 
they now require significant amounts of information to be 
reported directly to them by the banks, other than via their 
quarterly disclosures, meaning that they can no longer 
claim to be no better informed than the general public.
Another distinctive feature of the New Zealand approach 
to banking regulation is the absence of any process 
for on-site visits to banks by the monetary or supervisory 
authorities, such as commonly occurs in other jurisdictions. 
The Reserve Bank will from time to time meet with a bank’s 
management, but verification of a bank’s condition is 
otherwise undertaken only by external auditors.
3. The Attempts at Reregulation
Towards the end of the 1990s, it was becoming apparent 
that light-handed regulation of banks might not provide 
the best outcomes for New Zealand or bank depositors, 
particularly with the extent of foreign bank ownership. The 
Reserve Bank took some initiatives to allow it to take greater 
control over what banks were doing, although these were 
not always easy to implement. Among a series of changes 
made were some revised rules on corporate governance, 
to provide for more genuinely independent directors, 
including New Zealand resident directors.13 Obtaining and 
reporting of ratings from a credit rating agency approved 
by the Reserve Bank was made mandatory. The desire 
to maintain credit ratings and keep funding costs down 
accordingly is likely to have caused banks to act in a more 
conservative fashion.
Rules were also adopted to control banks’ outsourcing 
activities, with the objective that the Reserve Bank (or 
statutory managers) should have access to banks’ 
computer systems,14 in New Zealand, if parent banks got 
into difficulty, while the Reserve Bank also got the power 
to regulate payment systems (which had previously been 
wholly under the control of the banks themselves).
We also saw steps taken to get the Australian-owned 
Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac), in particular, to 
establish a New Zealand incorporated subsidiary. This was 
seen as of particular importance because of a concern 
that Australian depositors in the branch might be given 
priority in repayment of New Zealand deposits (reflecting 
the priority under the Australian Banking Act).15 This was 
part of a local incorporation policy, designed to ensure 
that larger and systemically significant banks had local 
boards of directors, which should be more responsive to 
New Zealand needs than the directors of a foreign bank 
operating a New Zealand branch (Chetwin, 2006). It was 
also argued that having a New Zealand-incorporated 
entity made matters clearer for creditors (depositors in 
particular), when statutory managers were appointed to a 
failing bank.16
In response to concerns about the risk profile of New 
Zealand bank funding, which were exacerbated during 
the depths of the global financial crisis in September and 
October 2008, we have also seen the reintroduction of 
specific rules on bank liquidity. The mismatch and core 
funding ratios apply to short and long term liquidity and 
funding risks respectively, and came into effect on 1 April 
2010 (Hoskin et al, 2009). This approach is broadly consistent 
with what has since been mandated internationally as 
part of Basel III, and is also consistent with what the banks 
appeared to be doing anyway as they sought to reduce 
the riskiness of their funding portfolios (Tripe & Shi, 2012).
A more problematic area of reregulation has been in 
developing a process for dealing with banks in financial 
distress. One proposal is for a system of open bank 
resolution (OBR), which would see bank deposits having a 
haircut applied to them, to provide funds to recapitalise a 
failing bank. Following the haircuts, funds remaining in the 
accounts at the failing bank would then be guaranteed 
(Hoskin & Woolford, 2011). A key outcome of the OBR is 
to reduce the social costs of financial institution failure by 
getting a bank re-opened promptly after the hair-cut has 
been applied, so that the payment system can resume 
operations (not necessarily possible under standard 
management, designed to limit the disruption caused by 
failures, rather than failure prevention, with occasional 
failures being perceived as desirable as a way of spreading 
the message about market discipline (Doughty, 1986). The 
scope of regulation was to be prudential: in other respects, 
the market was seen as being the most appropriate 
source of regulation for the New Zealand financial system 
(Grimes, 1998), although this could be supplemented by 
the broader legislative framework such as the Companies 
Act and Financial Reporting Standards. The concern for 
the financial system was subsequently affirmed by White 
(1990, 1991), who stressed the importance of protecting the 
payments system.
This view of regulation has regarded deposit insurance 
schemes, a standard international response to individual 
bank failures, as something to be avoided. Deposit 
insurance is seen as undermining depositors’ incentives 
to monitor banks, leaving banks to take greater risks than 
they might otherwise – a phenomenon described as 
moral hazard (White, 1990). In such a situation, it is possible 
that bank losses could be aggravated at the expense 
of taxpayers, who would be likely to be the ultimate 
underwriters of a deposit insurance scheme. The Reserve 
Bank has continued to uphold this argument.
Immediately following initial deregulation, there was 
an economic boom, seen particularly in a booming stock 
market and property development activity, followed by a 
bust, a key element in which was the 1987 share market 
crash. The bust in property development impacted 
severely on the banks that had supported it, leading in due 
course to the failure of the (formerly government-owned) 
Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in 1989, and to 
two bail-outs of the formerly government-owned Bank of 
New Zealand. This lead the Reserve Bank to give further 
consideration to issues around the prudential supervision of 
banks, a topic they had been able to overlook in former 
times when banks were much more restricted in the 
activities they undertook, and when competition between 
the banks was more limited. 
During the late 1980s and 1990s we also saw a substantial 
increase in the proportion of foreign ownership of the New 
Zealand banking sector, in some cases reflecting a lack 
of financial strength of the New Zealand owners, but also 
in response to the deregulated market. Previously New 
Zealand-owned entities such as the Post Office Savings 
Bank, the Bank of New Zealand and most of the trustee 
savings banks become part of international (predominantly 
Australian) banking groups. Deregulation made it easier 
for international banks to participate in the New Zealand 
market, while it also became more important for them to 
do so as New Zealand became more integrated into the 
global financial system. 
Within such a context the Reserve Bank deemed it 
appropriate to adopt the Basel Committee’s guidelines 
on bank capital adequacy. There was a view that this was 
driven primarily by a desire to conform to international 
norms (and to avoid the costs of not doing so), but stated 
views have generally been to the effect that more capital 
was better for promoting bank safety and soundness (and 
under the 1988 Basel I rules, New Zealand and Australia both 
imposed a capital requirement for holdings of government 
securities).
A further development in the prudential supervision of 
banks was the introduction of a bank specific disclosure 
regime, which came into effect at the beginning of 1996.5 
This requires banks, every quarter, to publish a balance 
sheet and year–to-date income statement, along with 
other financial and non-financial information6: on the basis 
of this, depositors are supposed to be able to assess the 
soundness of banks with which they place their funds, and 
to exercise market discipline by withdrawing their funds if 
they decide that the risk profile of the bank has changed 
adversely, putting their deposits at risk. A further principle 
was that the Reserve Bank would get the same information 
as was made available to the general public. If they had no 
better information than the general public, they could not 
then be said to be in a position to have acted to prevent 
a bank failure, and could not then be responsible for losses 
incurred by depositors (Brash, 1997a). 
There was also a view that the need for banks to report 
publicly every quarter would make them more cautious 
about their risk exposures (Brash, 1997b; 1998). In this respect, 
the bank’s board of directors was seen as particularly 
important, with their responsibilities to individually sign 
off on the disclosure statements making them liable to 
penalties if there was anything misleading or untrue in 
the disclosure statements.7 It was also envisaged that the 
disclosure statements would be reviewed and commented 
on by journalists and banking experts, who would highlight 
problems, for the public benefit.
Foreign ownership of the New Zealand banking system 
was also relevant, with the argument advanced in some 
circles that New Zealand did not need to regulate its banks 
as they were almost all subject to the oversight of foreign 
regulators.8
The protection provided to the public under the 
disclosure regime provided a justification for the Reserve 
Bank to remove some previously applied quantitative 
restrictions, with exposure limits replaced by requirements 
to report large exposures to individual counterparties and 
open foreign exchange positions. A similar approach was 
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most obvious source would be to repay those borrowings 
(which would be quite legal), but which might well deprive 
the New Zealand bank of the liquidity needed to maintain 
operations.17
The question then arises that, if the looting of a New 
Zealand bank is simple, why it has not been done already. 
Why have the Australian banks not already removed the 
resources from their New Zealand business and supplied 
these to their Australian parents? There are two main 
reasons why this has not happened. The first factor is the 
governance regime applying at parent company level: this 
is clearly much more robust for the major Australian banks, 
reflecting the influences of APRA and the ASX, than it was 
for New Zealand finance companies.
The second, more important factor is a desire to preserve 
a profitable business to receive an ongoing stream of returns 
into the future. Owners would be incentivised to loot a bank 
only if they regarded its future prospects as poor. Moreover, 
we know from the goodwill paid for acquisitions that the 
market value of New Zealand banks is generally substantially 
in excess of book values (of equity): any looting of banks 
would rapidly dissipate that surplus market value. Related 
to this is the general reluctance by banks to abandon their 
foreign subsidiaries, because of the potential effect on their 
perceived creditworthiness, and thus their agency credit 
ratings. The desire to maintain credit ratings is a factor 
which is likely to have contributed to more conservative 
bank behaviour, such as banks holding capital in excess of 
regulatory minima.
5. Concluding Thoughts
We have reached an interesting position. New Zealand 
financial markets have, since the deregulation of the 
1980s, been relatively lightly regulated, consistent with an 
approach that has required regulation to be justified, rather 
than the alternative view that might have required the 
argument to remove regulation. In such an environment, 
the more domestically focused parts of the New Zealand 
financial system have not fared particularly well, an effect 
which can be seen with the New Zealand Stock Exchange, 
which has a much smaller capitalisation relative to GDP 
than for example, Australia (although this difference cannot 
be attributed solely to regulatory effects).
The part of the financial system that seems to function 
best is the largely foreign-owned banking system, which 
is significantly governed by foreign regulators. Even here, 
however, the ability of the Reserve Bank to prevent foreign 
owners looting New Zealand banks is not especially strong. 
That this has not happened is, in the author’s view, more a 
matter of good luck and the constraints applied in banks’ 
home countries than anything else. We should not rely 
solely on Australian regulators because, as Kane (2006) 
notes, they are responsible to Australian rather than New 
Zealand taxpayers.
The disclosure regime is becoming less effective as a 
vehicle for protecting depositors’ interests. A key reason is 
that bank financial statements have become increasingly 
complex, reflecting both the increasing complexity of 
banks’ business and the adoption of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The process has not 
always been helped by changes to required disclosures, 
made in response to changes in regulation and to assist 
the banks by reducing the burden (and hence cost) of 
disclosure. Relatively little effort is now being directed at 
trying to comment on what is reported in banks’ disclosures.
At the same time, the process of bank liquidation has 
become more complex, with the value of assets as per 
banks’ financial statements increasingly differing from 
what might be available to repay depositors. As Bertram 
& Tripe (2012) have noted, categories of assets that might 
disappear could include cash borrowed from a parent 
bank, assets subject to repurchase agreements (potentially 
including residential mortgage backed securities), loans in 
covered bond pools, intangibles and deferred tax. It would 
be easy to see 40% of a bank’s assets disappearing by the 
time a statutory manager intervened!
Looking at matters from a longer term perspective, the 
1980s were characterised by a rush to remove previous 
regulation, and a regulatory structure was developed 
which was directed at the not especially globalised world 
of the 1980s. Since that time globalisation and new financial 
products have made financial markets and financial 
institutions a lot more complex, and the simple approaches 
to the resolution of failing institutions that might have 
worked in the 1980s would be likely to be overwhelmed by 
the much more complex financial institutions that exist in 
the 2010s. 
The New Zealand experience is of international relevance 
as well, particularly with the greater frequency of significant 
foreign ownership of banking systems. Foreign ownership 
poses challenges for host country regulators, and in some 
environments, such as the European Union, regulators’ roles 
in overseeing the local operations of foreign-owned banks 
can be quite limited. Gaining control of a banking system to 
encourage it to operate consistent with a national interest, 
but also within the confines of the invisible hand, can be a 
challenging process.
insolvency practices).
Although the banks have been required to establish 
computer systems to allow OBR to be implemented, 
debate over whether this is the most sensible approach 
to resolving failing banks has been limited. OBR relies on 
an assumption that depositors should have been able to 
protect themselves through the knowledge that deposits 
were not guaranteed, and that they could review disclosure 
statements to identify banks at risk.
We now see approaches internationally where, if banks 
are failing, bond-holders and other wholesale depositors 
may be bailed in and required to contribute to losses. There 
are some suggestions that the OBR is similar to this, but 
there are differences. The OBR proposals treat all creditors 
equally (although there may be scope to exempt some 
small depositors) rather than imposing the costs of failure 
on those counterparties who might be better positioned to 
bear them. Moreover, other countries provide some form 
of deposit insurance or guarantee for retail depositors, a 
protection which is absent in New Zealand.
OBR might have been reasonable in a simpler 
environment such as existed in the 1980s, and is certainly 
consistent with the philosophy of light-handed regulation. 
There is an expectation that depositors should bear some of 
the cost of a failure because of their own failure to monitor 
the bank with which they do business. It is, however, less 
clear as to how effective OBR can be in the more complex 
banking environment that now exists.
4. The Effect of Regulation
An additional key rationale for regulation is the corporate 
governance problem, as set out by Shleifer & Vishny (1997):
“How do suppliers of finance get managers to return 
some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that 
managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in 
bad projects?” (p 737).
This is even more of a challenge in financial services 
than in other areas, in that electronic money is hard to 
trace, and can be diverted to a wide range of other uses. 
Where financial services firms are managed by owners, 
such as with foreign-owned banks or closely held finance 
companies (and it has been argued that this was a 
particular problem in the New Zealand finance company 
sector, where depositors/investors incurred substantial 
losses), this can be even more of a challenge, as scope for 
independent oversight may be limited to periodic external 
audits. Against this background, regulation, which should 
be part of broader corporate regulation, has to ensure that 
financial institutions are run consistent with their supposed 
purposes, and that the funds are not looted (in the sense 
of Akerlof & Romer, 1993). In the financial sector, regulation 
is particularly important because of the roles that financial 
institutions play in a modern society, and their privileged 
position in terms of the means of payment that society uses. 
What are the constraints that apply to the management 
and owners of financial institutions to discourage them from 
looting the resources, deposits, with which they have been 
entrusted? As the Reserve Bank and others have noted, 
this is more complex in New Zealand because the banks 
are predominantly foreign-owned: if the owners seek to 
appropriate resources to other uses, it is difficult to recover 
them. We saw how complicated this was for the finance 
company sector in New Zealand since 2006: to take action, 
the authorities needed to establish that there was some sort 
of criminal culpability, and then try to find money that might 
still be available to repay the depositors who entrusted it to 
the institutions in the first place. 
In banking, the sums involved are relatively much larger 
than for non-banks, reflecting the much greater significance 
of banks in New Zealand financial intermediation. The issue 
of concern from a regulatory perspective would be that 
resources at New Zealand banks might be transferred to a 
foreign parent and that the New Zealand bank might act 
in the foreign parent’s interests, rather than those of the 
bank’s business in the New Zealand market.
Much regulatory effort since the late 1990s has been 
directed at this issue. There was a view that, with Westpac 
incorporating a subsidiary in New Zealand, the New Zealand 
system was somehow protected, in that any transfer of funds 
from a New Zealand bank that made the New Zealand 
bank insolvent would mean that the directors, particularly 
New Zealand resident directors, could be prosecuted. This 
also justified a stronger role for independent directors.
It is doubtful that this would really afford much 
protection to New Zealand if the Australian parent bank 
was in difficulty. Would managers on secondment (from 
Australia) and Australian-based directors and owners really 
care that much about New Zealand directors? Moreover, 
one needs to be mindful of the typical structure of New 
Zealand subsidiary balance sheets, which usually have 
significant borrowings from parent banks. If a foreign owner 
was looking for resources that could be repatriated, the 
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Notes
1. See Quigley (1992) for a review of financial regulation in earlier periods.
2. See Hodgetts (1992) for a more detailed chronology of some of the relevant events. Evans et al (1996) suggest that the
financial sector was an area where deregulation proceeded most rapidly.
3. See Nicholl & King (1985) for a more extensive discussion of the role of official short-term money market dealers.
4. Although, as we are reminded by Grimes (1998), there had previously been no system for the prudential supervision of
New Zealand banks.
5. Banks had been required to issue Securities Act-type prospectuses if they wished to accept retail deposits following
the passage of the 1986 amendment to the Reserve Bank Act, but the disclosure requirements under the new regime
were more specifically directed at the risks banks faced, and were required to be produced quarterly (rather than
6-monthly, as previously) by all banks (and not just those which sought retail deposits).
6. More information on the data required to be disclosed under the disclosure regime, and the principles that underpinned 
it, are provided in Mortlock (1996a). There have been changes to the detail of what is required to be disclosed since
the scheme’s introduction, but the principles remain the same.
7. This is discussed at greater depth by Mortlock (1996b, 2002)
8. See, for example, Heffernan (2005), p 178 (footnote 7) and Turner (2000), although Brash (1997a) specifically argued
against this proposition.
9. This changed with the adoption of Basel II in 2008, following which banks are now required to hold capital against
market risk.
10. Reserve Bank monitoring is generally focused on making sure that banks comply with the disclosure rules.
11. See Bollard (2003) for further discussion of these issues.
12. See, for example, McIntyre et al (2009). Wilson et al (2012) could not find evidence for the effect of market discipline,
although they did find evidence for banks exercising self-discipline in response to the disclosure regime.
13. See, for example Bollard (2004). A further set of rules following a review were announced in December 2010.
14. See Ng (2007) for more detail on this.
15. The other major banks already conducted the majority of their New Zealand business through New Zealand
incorporated subsidiaries. The Reserve Bank had been going through a process of setting conditions under which
banks would not be allowed to operate as branches, but only as subsidiaries (see Mortlock, 2003). These conditions
implied change only for Westpac (although they may have discouraged other banks from taking retail deposits). The
policy would also have been likely to have impacted on Australian-owned AMP Banking, but they chose to sell their
business and withdraw from the New Zealand market.
16. See Evans & Quigley (2002) for a more extensive discussion of the relevant issues.
17. Kaufman (2004) questions whether it makes any difference if a local bank operates as a branch or as a subsidiary of
a holding company.
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